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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2a-3(2)(k)(1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the 
incident at issue did not proximately cause the injuries claimed by plaintiff? 
In reviewing a challenge to a civil jury verdict, the appellate court views all 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). The appellate court must assume the jury believed the evidence 
and inferences that support the verdict. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 417 
(Utah 1989). When conflicting evidence was introduced at trial, appellate courts assume the 
jury believed those facts that support its verdict. l i . 
The verdict of the jury will only be reversed if there is no substantial evidence 
to support it, and the appellate court concludes that reasonable people would not differ on the 
outcome of the case. Crookston. 817 P.2d at 799; Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 475 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting evidence that 
defendant was employed by Brigham Young University and then later admitting evidence that 
defendant was returning from a Mormon church service at the time of the accident? 
The admission of evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion and is made in two steps. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 
1993). The reviewing court must first determine whether the trial court's finding that the 
evidence was admissible was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. If the admission of the 
evidence was beyond the limits of reasonability, then the reviewing court will reverse only if 
there was a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached had the 
evidence been excluded. IcL; Utah DOT v. 6200 South Associates. 872 P.2d 462 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
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3. Whether defense counsel's closing argument was so prejudicial that 
reversal is warranted when counsel referred to the name of plaintiff s counsel's law firm? 
Because counsel have considerable latitude in their closing arguments, 
improper comments by counsel warrant reversal only if the appellate court concludes that 
absent the improper argument, there was a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more 
favorable to the plaintiff. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) and Utah Rule of Evidence 403 have 
application in this case. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(2) defendant 
refers the court to the Addendum of Appellant's Brief for copies of these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a civil action in which plaintiff claimed significant 
injuries, including Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, resulting from an automobile accident. 
Defendant maintained that the impact of the accident was not significant enough to cause the 
claimed injuries. The jury returned a verdict that the accident did not proximately cause the 
injuries plaintiff claimed and plaintiff has appealed claiming the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict, prejudicial evidence was admitted, and that improper arguments were 
allowed. 
In its attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, Plaintiff 
asks this court to consider evidence which was not presented to the jury. On page 8 of 
Plaintiffs Brief, plaintiff states: 
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Prior to trial, Duncan served interrogatories on Brown requesting him to 
identify the location of his car prior to impact and his speed immediately prior 
to impact. 
Brown's answer was: 17(e), see accident report; (f) see accident report. 
The accident report showed that Brown's vehicle was going 40 miles an hour 
when it was distracted by flashing lights and 25 miles per hour upon impact. 
Significantly, neither the interrogatories nor the police report were admitted into evidence. 
Plaintiff has attached the same to her Brief, and because they have not been admitted into 
evidence, they should be disregarded by this court. Except for this point, plaintiff's 
statement of the case accurately reviews some of the evidence admitted at trial and the 
procedural history of this case.1 Plaintiffs statement of the case, however, omits a majority 
of the evidence upon which the jury may have rested its verdict has been omitted. Plaintiff 
has failed to marshal the evidence as required by the appellate courts. Plaintiffs failure to 
marshal the evidence is discussed more fully infra at page 22. 
'Plaintiff states on page 5 of her Brief that she made a Motion for a New Trial and 
indicated the bases of the Motion. However, plaintiff fails to note that the thrust of her 
motion for a New Trial was not that the plaintiff had been prejudiced or that the jury 
rendered its verdict under the influence of passion in regards to whether defendant was a 
BYU professor or not, but that "the jury favored the defendant because they were not aware 
that he had insurance coverage. The jury did not want the defendant to have to pay out of 
his pocket. The jury is not to concern itself with how a judgment is paid." (R. 258). In 
fact, plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial alleged that the jury deliberated for eight hours 
because of a 4/4 split, and that plaintiffs counsel had contacted members of the jury to 
determine how they had decided the case. Plaintiffs attack on the jury deliberations was not 
supported by an affidavit of any juror, but only upon plaintiffs counsel's affidavit that he 
contacted "a couple of the jurors." (R. 289). 
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On page 7 of plaintiffs brief she relates the following facts accurately. On 
December 2, 1988, plaintiff completed her Christmas shopping in Provo and was headed 
north on University Avenue. The light at the intersection of University Avenue and 3700 
North was red. Approximately 15 cars were in front of plaintiff. The weather was good, 
the road was dry, and the time was 5:30 pm. At or about that time, plaintiff was rear-ended 
by a car driven by defendant Jack Brown. Defendant Brown was distracted by the flashing 
lights of the Sheriffs car parked on the side of the road. Utah County Sheriffs Officer 
David Hill had stopped to give a citation to another motorist when he witnessed Brown 
skidding and rear-ending the plaintiff. Officer Hill's best estimate of the speed of 
defendant's vehicle was 5 miles per hour upon impact. 
The evidence which plaintiff failed to marshal is as follows. Plaintiff stated 
that upon impact, she was thrown forward. (R.415). Plaintiff also stated to Officer Baum 
that she had been thrown forward. (R.417). Likewise, plaintiff stated that her car was 
thrown forward. (R.445). In fact, plaintiff estimated that her car had been thrown forward 
two car lengths. (R.448). Nonetheless, plaintiff testified that she did not hit the car in front 
of her. (R.449). In her deposition, she stated that the car in front of her was a full car 
length ahead, but upon reflection changed that deposition answer to indicate that the car in 
front of her was only six feet ahead. (R.450). 
At trial, plaintiff needed to read her deposition because she could not recall 
what happened to her body at the time of the accident. Plaintiff was asked: 
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Question: So you remember your neck going forward? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And then, did it go back as well? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Do you recall it going back or are you just assuming? 
Answer: Well, when I came forward and then—well, when I came forward 
and then set myself back up. 
Question: Did you essentially straight arm, you know, push yourself back with 
your arms, or do you recall? 
Answer: I don't recall. 
Question: Do you recall the back of your head coming in contact with the 
headrest of the vehicle? 
Answer: As I set back up, I set back up against it and immediately got out of 
the car. 
(R.479). This point was then clarified: 
Let me make sure I understand what you told me. Your head flopped forward 
and you with your own muscles, using your own strength sat yourself back up, 
correct? 
Answer: Yes. 
(R.480). Plaintiff admitted no ambulance was called, nor were EMT's summoned. Id, 
Plaintiff admitted that prior to the accident she and her husband had 
constructed a home, and that she had helped with the construction. Plaintiff further testified 
that at the time of the accident she had a three-month old baby, and that she carried her 
smaller children often. (R.483). 
Plaintiff unequivocally stated that at the time of the accident she was stopped 
and had her foot on the brake. (R.492). Plaintiff admitted that she was first diagnosed with 
Thoracic Outlet Syndrome in January of 1990, over a year after the accident. (R.493). 
Plaintiff stated that Dr. Cooper, her chiropractor, never diagnosed thoracic outlet symptoms 
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in any of the 60 visits during which she was treated prior to being diagnosed with Thoracic 
Outlet Syndrome. (R.494). Plaintiff admitted that discoloration of her arm began after the 
60 visits with Dr. Cooper. (R.495). Plaintiff testified that during the treatment by Dr. 
Cooper, the chiropractor, put pressure on her shoulder in order to "crack" her back, and also 
used "significant force" on her neck to make her neck pop as well. (R.495-96). Plaintiff 
admitted that she had treated with chiropractors in the past, and in fact, in one instance had 
been treated for back ache during a pregnancy. (R.497). Lastly, plaintiff admitted that she 
had been referred to Dr. Gaufin, her treating surgeon, by the attorney who was handling her 
case at that time. (R.498). 
Defendant, Jack Brown, explained his statement to Officer Baum concerning 
whether or not he was traveling at 40 miles an hour at the time of the accident. Mr. Brown 
explained: 
As soon as I saw the yellow light I began to slow. And that was the 40 miles 
I had indicated, at least to me, indicated the speed I was going when I saw the 
yellow light. We continued to slow. I took my foot off the accelerator and 
just let it run. And then we were distracted and looked to the side. I noticed 
the light was green, just turned green ahead of us. And then we turned to 
look at the flashing yellow light and was distracted for that moment, turned 
back and saw the car in front of me. I slammed on my brakes. I was able to 
observe that I couldn't go left because the car was coming from the opposite 
direction. I could not go right because the policeman's vehicle was standing 
right there directly at the side of me. And so the only alternative was to go 
straight ahead. 
(R.395-96; compare with R.380). 
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Mr. Brown testified that he did not feel anything upon impact, nor was he 
pushed forward or hit into anything. (R.396). Incidentally, Mrs. Brown who was sitting 
next to Mr. Brown felt nothing either. (R.722). 
Mr. Brown testified that he was not in a hurry. (R.399). Mr. Brown stated 
that he did not tell Officer Baum, the investigating officer, how fast he was going upon 
impact. (R.400). Mr. Brown believed that if he had had another second to brake, the 
accident would not have occurred. Id, Mr. Brown stated that the damage to his vehicle was 
fairly depicted in the pictures presented at trial. (R.401). Mr. Brown also stated that the 
photographs of plaintiff s vehicle, attached hereto as Addendum 1, accurately depicted the 
damage as it existed after the accident. I<L Mr. Brown testified that he took the car to a 
dealer to have the front end inspected and that no internal damage was found. (R.405). As 
plaintiff has provided in her statement of the case, Mr. Brown testified that plaintiff said she 
was okay at the scene of the accident. (R.400). 
Two law enforcement officers testified in this matter. Officer Baum, the 
investigating officer, and Officer Hill, a witness. Officer Baum testified that he was working 
part-time when he investigated this accident. Although Officer Baum arguably testified as 
an expert in the area of accident reconstruction, he admitted that he was unfamiliar with 
federal bumper absorption standards. (R.520). Officer Baum stated that he just estimated 
the speed of this accident by looking at the damage. (R.521). Officer Baum's estimate of 
speed was made although he conducted no test to see the internal structures of the vehicle, 
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nor could he say what kind of forces would produce the kind of damages as seen in the 
accident at issue. (R.521). Officer Baum stated that he did not use Officer Hill's estimate of 
speed as a basis of his opinion. (R.523). 
Officer Hill, an actual eyewitness to the accident, stated that he has 
investigated over 100 accidents in 10 years. (R.601). He testified that he looked directly at 
the accident as it happened. (R.603; 613). Officer Hill said that plaintiffs vehicle was 
moved a foot or less. (R.604). In fact, Officer Hill stated that it is possible plaintiffs 
vehicle did not move at all. (R.610). Officer Hill testified that he disagreed with Officer 
Baum in the estimation of speed (R.607), and as plaintiff has stated in her statement of the 
case, Officer Hill's best estimate of speed was 5 miles per hour. (R.604; 610). 
Lieutenant Greg DuVal, of the Provo Police Department, testified as an 
accident reconstructionist. Plaintiff inaccurately refers to Mr. DuVal as a part-time 
reconstructionist. In actuality, Mr. DuVal is a professional reconstructionist on a part-time 
basis, however, his full-time job is as a police officer for Provo City, a job in which his 
duties include accident reconstruction for the city. (R.685). Mr. DuVal testified and 
informed the jury of what exactly a reconstructionist does. (R.686). Mr. DuVal estimated 
that he has reconstructed in excess of 500 accidents in the last six or so years. (R.686). 
Mr. DuVal indicated that in preparation for his testimony he had reviewed a copy of the 
accident report, examined the vehicle being driven by defendant in this case, removed 
various parts of the defendant's vehicle to determine any internal damage, reviewed 
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photographs of the vehicle plaintiff was driving, and reviewed the depositions that had been 
taken in the case. (R.688). Additionally, Mr. DuVal had spoken personally with Officer 
Hill, an eyewitness to the accident. (R.688). 
Mr. DuVal testified that he went to the police academy for his initial police 
training, and thereafter attended an intermediate accident investigation school, an advanced 
accident investigation school, and a reconstruction school all within the State of Utah. 
Subsequent thereto, Mr. DuVal attended Northwestern University in Chicago and went 
through their reconstruction program. (R.689). Mr. DuVal has attended courses taught at 
the Institute of Police Technology and Management and has attended other meetings and 
educational opportunities surrounding accident reconstruction. (R.689). Mr. DuVal stated 
that he was familiar with Federal Bumper Standards and explained what they were to the 
jury. (R.690). Mr. DuVal compared and verified the weights of the particular vehicles 
involved in this accident and based upon the damage to those vehicles, as well as speaking 
with witnesses and defendant, and reading plaintiffs deposition, came to a conclusion 
regarding speed. (R.691). 
Mr. DuVal stated that damage to vehicles can be an indication of the speed the 
vehicles were traveling at the time of the accident. (R.691). Mr. DuVal testified 
specifically that as to defendant's vehicle, a person using their own strength could bend the 
hood of that vehicle. (R. 695). Mr. DuVal testified: 
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[A]s far as the damage to this car [defendant's vehicle], it is very, very small. 
We're talking an inch or two of plastic that's broken out that's recessed in 
there. This plastic is so weak I could stand on it and break it. With 
something like that we are talking about a very low speed. Three is a very 
good speed that could cause this damage. 
The radiator is five inches behind the bumper as its measurement shows. Any 
of these pieces didn't have any opportunity to get damaged, but there's no 
strength across this area of the car. It would be very easy to contact the 
radiator with a bumper if the speed were larger than three miles an hour. The 
headlights are damaged, therefore we're talking about a very low speed. 
(R.695-96). Mr. DuVal testified that he compared the damages in this case with testing data 
to see if his conclusion of three miles an hour was consistent therewith. Mr. DuVal stated 
that it was. (R.696). 
Mr. DuVal testified that under the laws of physics if one is hit from behind 
they will be moved backwards. Mr. DuVal explained to the jury: 
To give you an idea, if we were to have two equally weighted objects and one 
was traveling at five miles per hour when it collides with the back end of 
another object, it will accelerate that object to half of the impact speed or at 
two-and-a-half miles per hour. The fact that we have a heavier front vehicle 
and a lighter rear vehicle, means that the acceleration to the forward vehicle 
will be less. In this case it's about 45 percent of the total impact speed would 
be imparted to the front vehicle. 
(R.698). Mr. DuVal stated: "If the brake were on and [the] foot still on the brake pedal, 
there would be very little if any movement of the vehicle from the impact." (R.700). Mr. 
DuVal also explained how forces are absorbed: 
The forces are absorbed, one, by the creation of the damage, or two, the 
allowances that the bumper and things have. There is also absorption through 
the suspension system, through the seats, such as these padded seats we sit in. 
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If we were sitting in a car when a collision occurs, it's absorbed into the seat 
of the car as well. 
(R.700-01). Mr. DuVal analogized the impact force of this accident to one where one rolls 
into a parking block in a parking lot. (R.701). 
Mr. DuVal also testified that at three miles an hour one would need only five 
inches to stop. Mr. DuVal concluded that if Mr. Brown, the defendant, would have had five 
more inches to skid, he would have stopped short of touching the car. (R.712). Mr. DuVal 
testified that plaintiffs testimony that she was moved forward towards the steering wheel and 
then pushed herself back and sat up is inconsistent with the laws of physics. (R.713). 
Four medical doctors testified in this matter: Dr. Mclff, Dr. Gaufin, Dr. Root, 
and Dr. Cooper. Dr. Cooper testified that in the history that plaintiff gave him she stated 
that she was hit at 40 miles per hour. (R.638). Also, plaintiff indicated she was moving at 
the time of the accident. (R.638). Dr. Cooper admitted that there is a correlation between 
the force and injury; that is, that there must be some force in order for an injury to occur. 
(R.666). Dr. Cooper explained to the jury that he is a doctor of chiropractic, not a medical 
doctor. He explained that he only has an associates degree, and did not receive a bachelor's 
degree prior to going to chiropractic school. (R.667). Dr. Cooper testified that in over 60 
visits he never diagnosed plaintiff with Thoracic Outlet Syndrome. (R.670). Dr. Cooper 
admitted that if there was no force there could be no injury. (R.670). Dr. Cooper further 
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admitted that if someone were to push another from behind there would not be enough force 
created to cause a flexion/extension injury. (R.681-682). 
Dr. Max Root testified that he is a medical doctor specializing in physical 
medicine and rehabilitation. (R.615). Dr. Root admitted that in order for an injury to occur 
there must be force, and that, therefore, there is a correlation between the speed of colliding 
vehicles and whether a party could be injured. When the doctor was asked: "So regardless 
of whether we're experts in sheet metal or car parts, whatever, if there's no force on the 
person, there is no possibility of injury, correct? Answer: Yes." (R.626). Dr. Root also 
testified that if one is hit in a rear-end accident, any force would cause the head to go 
backward. (R.628). The doctor stated: "If there wasn't enough force there could not be a 
whiplash injury." (R.628). Dr. Root testified that his treatment of plaintiff would have been 
the same whether or not her complaints were trauma-related. (R.629). Dr. Root had no 
independent recollection of the patient's history, but stated that his records indicated the 
history he was given was that plaintiff was rear-ended at 40 miles per hour. (R.630). 
Dr. Lynn Gaufin, plaintiffs physician of choice, is a medical doctor and the 
surgeon who performed a first rib resection in treating plaintiff for Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome. Dr. Gaufin testified that the history communicated to him by plaintiff was that 
she was hit at 40 miles an hour. (R.536). Dr. Gaufin stated that Thoracic Outlet Syndrome 
can be caused by any sort of repetitive use of muscles, that specifically, Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome can be caused by exercise, carrying things, and building things. (R.572). Dr. 
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Gaufin testified that Thoracic Outlet Syndrome can be associated with childbirth, as well as 
lifting and carrying babies and small children. Id. Dr. Gaufin admitted that he conducted no 
outside investigation of this case. (R.573). Dr. Gaufin acknowledged that plaintiff has a 
congenitally small outlet, but stated that even someone with a congenitally small outlet can 
experience a traumatic event, where relatively minor force or trauma is experienced, and not 
suffer any consequence. (R.573). Dr. Gaufin stated that if one is struck from behind they 
go backward, not forward. (R.574). Dr. Gaufin stated that in order for a problem in the 
thoracic outlet region to occur, one would necessarily need forces severe enough to tear 
muscles. (R.574). Dr. Gaufin stated: "If the force was not a violent force then you would 
have to look for some other cause other than the accident to produce the symptoms." 
(R.575-76). Dr. Gaufin stated that chiropractic manipulation could cause thoracic outlet 
problems. (R.575). Dr. Gaufin stated that he had been given no history of preexisting neck 
pain, head pain, shoulder pain, or upper back pain by plaintiff. (R.576). Dr. Gaufin stated 
that the plaintiff did not report prior problems of arthritis in the chest to him. (R.577). 
Dr. Gaufin noted adhesions or scarring tissue in the thoracic outlet when he 
performed surgery on plaintiff and at trial stated that such adhesions were consistent with 
repetitive micro-trauma. (R.577). Dr. Gaufin stated that Thoracic Outlet Syndrome can 
become symptomatic, and then alternatively asymptomatic. (R.578). Dr. Gaufin did not 
review plaintiffs prior medical records. (R.579). Dr. Gaufin stated that he would not 
expect an impact occurring between three and four miles an hour to cause a thoracic outlet 
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aggravation or injury. (R.581-82). Dr. Gaufin testified that the possibility that an impact 
less than five miles an hour caused thoracic outlet problems was a very small, even remote, 
possibility. (R.581-83). Dr. Gaufin testified that temporal mandibular joint problems (TMJ) 
can have symptoms such as neck pain and headache. (R.584). Dr. Gaufin stated that neck 
pain does not necessarily mean that one is having problems with their thoracic outlet. 
(R.588-89). 
Dr. E. Bruce Mclff is a neuroradiologist practicing at Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center. (R.739). Dr. Mclff stated that he has a special interest in Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome. (R.741). Because of this special interest in Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, and his 
experience in the area, Dr. Mclff believes he has a thorough understanding of Thoracic 
Outlet Syndrome. (R.741-42). Dr. Mclff explained to the jury how Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome is diagnosed and told the jury how he developed the procedure that is used at Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center; that is, how he modified the normal procedure used, and 
how he taught that procedure to Dr. Wing who is the radiologist who performed the 
angiogram on plaintiff in this case. (R.742-43). 
Dr. Mclff stated that the typical age for spontaneous onset of symptoms of 
Thoracic Outlet Syndrome is 25 to 35 years of age. (R.745). Dr. Mclff explained to the 
jury that Thoracic Outlet Syndrome arises more in females than in males (R.746), and that 
the cause is usually a congenitally small thoracic outlet. (R.749). Dr. Mclff stated that 
Thoracic Outlet Syndrome can be caused by trauma, such as fracture of the clavicle, by 
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callous formation, or bone disease. Id. In reviewing the radiological films in this matter, 
Dr. Mclff stated that plaintiff has no evidence of fracture of the clavicle or fracture of the 
ribs. (R.749). Dr. Mclff stated that he had reviewed Dr. Gaufm's operative notes. (R.749-
50). In those notes there was mention of more than the typical amount of fibrous tissue or 
adhesions in plaintiffs thoracic outlet. (R.750). Dr. Mclff stated that this fibrous tissue 
could have resulted from repetitive use. (R.750-51). Dr. Mclff stated that chest pain can 
indicate Thoracic Outlet Syndrome and there have been instances where an initial diagnosis 
of heart attack had been made, but it turned out to be a thoracic outlet problem. (R.751). 
Dr. Mclff testified that it is much more common to see thoracic outlet problems caused by 
repetitive kinds of relatively minor trauma, by which he meant the activities of normal life. 
(R.752). Dr. Mclff also testified that thoracic outlet problems are seen in housekeepers who 
repeatedly sweep, mop and scrub floors. IcL 
Dr. Mclff stated: 
A single event--the only documented single events have been those that have 
documented fracture with callous formation. To assume that a single event 
would produce enough adhesions and trigger it, it would take a fairly 
significant single event. 
(R.752-53). Dr. Mclff concluded: 
Most things that we see that end up with a focal abnormality, all the way from 
bone tumors to brain tumors, patients frequently go back and say yes, I 
bumped my leg two-and-a-half years ago; I had a bruise here. So the question 
you're asking, do we relate these kinds of things to single events, the answer 
is that that's a very common thing. 
Question: Even if it has no causative relationship? 
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Answer: Even if it has no causative relationship. 
(R.753). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. ABUNDANT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial upon the basis that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the verdict. First, plaintiff has waived the right to attack the sufficiency 
of the evidence by failing to make a directed verdict motion. By allowing the matter to go to 
the jury without making a directed verdict motion, plaintiff gambled on a higher standard of 
review in the event that the defendant appealed the verdict. In this case, plaintiff gambled 
and lost. 
Plaintiffs request that the appellate court review the sufficiency of the 
evidence is likewise barred by plaintiffs failure to marshal the evidence. In defendant's 
Statement of the Facts, defendant has listed almost 100 items of evidence cited to the record 
which plaintiff failed to marshal. For this reason, when the plaintiff omits the majority of 
the facts upon which the jury's verdict could have rested, the court should not address the 
matter. 
In any event, abundant evidence existed for the jury to find that an extremely 
low-speed impact was involved in this accident, and that it could not have proximately 
caused the injuries plaintiff claimed. Defendant and his wife stated that they felt nothing 
upon impact. The only objective eyewitness to the accident said his best estimate of speed 
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was five miles per hour, and that plaintiffs vehicle might not have even moved forward. An 
expert in reconstruction showed the jury numerous reasons to believe that an insignificant 
impact had occurred. By accepting the defendant's contention that an insignificant impact 
had occurred, the jury could thereafter accept the medical testimony that without sufficient 
force an injury cannot occur. It was pointed out to the jury that plaintiff suffered from 
symptoms similar to those claimed in the lawsuit prior to the accident. Likewise, medical 
doctors explained that plaintiffs gender and lifestyle could have been a precipitating factor in 
plaintiffs physical problems. 
II. THERE WAS NO IMPROPER INJECTION OF THE ISSUE OF RELIGION 
INTO THIS TRIAL 
As a foundational background question, defense counsel asked defendant where 
he worked. The jury was informed that defendant worked at BYU and taught Spanish. 
Later, defense counsel asked plaintiff the purpose of his trip, to which defendant answered 
that he and his wife were returning from a trip to a local Mormon Temple. The question 
concerning defendant's work place is not prejudicial as it was simply foundational 
background information. In fact, plaintiffs counsel asked similar background foundational 
questions of plaintiff. 
Defense counsel's question concerning the nature of defendant's trip was well 
within the realm of relevancy since it related to the state of mind of the defendant; for 
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example, the question was probative of whether he was in a hurry and whether or not he was 
attentive while driving. 
III. NO PREJUDICIAL ARGUMENT WAS MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
In her Brief, plaintiff outlines four instances of alleged misconduct by defense 
counsel. On two of these instances, plaintiff did not object and therefore has waived any 
right to assert error based thereon. 
Plaintiff assigns error to the statement of defendant's counsel that plaintiffs 
counsel brought the suit. Such a comment was allowable in that plaintiffs counsel tried to 
blame defendant for requiring plaintiff to go to trial. Plaintiffs counsel asked the jury 
rhetorically why defendant had put plaintiff "through the hoops." He asserted that defendant, 
by and through his counsel, had lengthened the trial improperly. It is to this statement that 
defense counsel was replying. The comments made by defense counsel were not improper 
because they were responsive to comments made by plaintiffs counsel. Since there is no 
basis upon which error can be predicated, this court should affirm the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABUNDANT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Abundant material evidence exists to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, 
plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial. However, this court should not make a determination 
of whether the evidence supports the verdict in this case because plaintiff failed to make a 
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directed verdict motion concerning proximate cause below. Likewise, plaintiff has failed to 
marshal the evidence and therefore may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
A. PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO ATTACK THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE BY FAILING TO MAKE A 
DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION 
"The law is that one who does not move for a directed verdict generally has 
no standing to urge on appeal that the evidence does not support the judgment." Henderson 
v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290, 291 (Utah 1975). Accord Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 27 
Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972). The record below only indicates that plaintiff moved for 
a directed verdict regarding the negligence of the defendant. (R. 727-729). A review of the 
record indicates that plaintiff never made a directed verdict motion on the issue of proximate 
cause. Accordingly, plaintiff should not be allowed to attack the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict on this issue. 
While taking exceptions to the jury instructions, defense counsel took 
exception to the special verdict form. Defense counsel asked the court to split the medical 
bills into categories of past and future, and to have the issue of permanent disability 
separately determined by the jury. Defense counsel requested this action so that a record on 
the no-fault tort threshold could be made. It was defendant's belief that the plaintiff had not 
met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31a-22-309. The court ruled: 
Well, the court has advised you, now on the record I will state that the court, 
as a matter of law, finds that the threshold has been met by the expenditure of 
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medical expenses that were reasonably and necessarily incurred in excess of 
$3,000. 
(R. 761). The appellate court should note that this was not plaintiffs motion. It was only a 
ruling of the court denying defendant's request to have medical bills split on the special 
verdict form. 
Plaintiff now wishes to have this ruling construed as a directed verdict as to 
causation. Plaintiffs claim fails for a number of reasons. First, there was no motion by 
plaintiff for such action. Second, the court did not actually rule as to causation, but only that 
an expenditure of $3,000 in medical expenses had occurred. Lastly, although defendant does 
not appeal this ruling, the ruling was erroneously made. Utah Code Annotated § 31a-22-
309(1) provides: 
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action 
for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following: 
(c) permanent disability; 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
Defendant is unsure of whether the court understood his request to have the 
medical bills separated by categories of past or future as the record reveals. (R. 761). It is 
the defendant's position that if the jury came back with a verdict of less than $3,000, the trial 
court would have to enter a verdict of no cause of action finding plaintiff had not met the 
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requirements of § 31A-22-309. In any event, because no motion was made by plaintiff for a 
directed verdict regarding this tort threshold or the issue of causation, and because the court 
did not make any ruling as to causation, this court should disregard plaintiffs argument 
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 
Failure of the appellant here to present to the trial court a motion for directed 
verdict not only foreclosed the trial court from consideration of his motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but . . . such failure precludes the 
appellate court from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
verdict. 
Brigham v. Moonlake Electric Assoc. 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970)(citation 
ommitted). The Nevada Supreme Court explained the policy behind this rule. In Price v. 
Sinnot. 460 P.2d 837 (Nev. 1969), the court stated: 
It is solidly established that when there is no request for a directed verdict, the 
question of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is not reviewable, 
(citations omitted). A party may not gamble on the jury's verdict and then 
later, when displeased with the verdict, challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support it. 
IdL at 841. In this case, plaintiff gambled. If she had made the directed verdict motion and 
won, the issue would have been reviewed de novo, since the decision to grant a directed 
verdict is a legal conclusion wherein no deference is given to the trial court. Management 
Comm. of Grace Pine Homeowners Assoc, v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1982). On the other hand, when plaintiff allowed the issue of causation to go to the jury, 
plaintiff gambled that she would prevail. If the matter were to be appealed, all inferences 
would go in favor of the prevailing party. In this case, plaintiff gambled and lost. 
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Plaintiff claims numerous times in her Brief that the court directed a verdict in 
favor of plaintiff on whether she sustained injuries as a result of the accident. .See Plaintiff's 
Brief at 4, 5, and 11. In each instance plaintiff maintains that the court ruled as a matter of 
law that plaintiff sustained medical expenses "as a result of the accident." See Id. Such is 
not the case, as stated, since the court only stated that the threshold had been met by the 
"expenditure" of medical expenses of excess of $3,000. Defendant never disputed that 
plaintiff had gone to the doctor enough times to incur $3,000 in medical bills. Defendant did 
dispute that plaintiffs injuries were a result of the accident and that defendant should be 
responsible therefore. 
More importantly, plaintiff has waived any right to claim that the verdict is 
inconsistent with the earlier ruling of the court. As plaintiff has pointed out, the jury was 
asked to resolve only two issues: whether Brown's negligence caused Duncan's injuries, and 
if so, what amount of damages should she be awarded. See plaintiffs brief at 5 and R. 222-
224 and the Judgment on the Special Verdict R. 250-252. Plaintiff never excepted to the 
jury form. Therefore, since no directed verdict as to causation was made, and no exception 
to the jury's special verdict form was made, no error can be predicated thereon. 
Accordingly, the court should not review the sufficiency of the verdict.2 
2Although plaintiff cites to the record concerning defendant's motion relative to § 31A-
22-309, plaintiff does not argue the point at all in her Brief. 
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B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence. More specifically, plaintiff has 
neglected to follow the appellate court's admonitions and instructions as laid out in West 
Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and more 
recently recited in Oneida-SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) wherein the court stated: 
[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshaling] duty . . . the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence produced at trial which 
supports the very finding the appellant resists. 
Id. Thereafter, the appellant must show the verdict is so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of evidence, thus making the verdict clearly erroneous. Id. The appellate 
courts of Utah have noted that the marshaling requirement reflects that the appellate courts 
do not sit to retry cases and will refuse to consider the merits of challenges if the evidence is 
not marshaled. 
Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence in this case, and in fact, the same 
could be said of plaintiff s arguments as was said concerning a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence in Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991): 
As written, their arguments are reasonable and have persuasive effect. From 
the point of view of appellate procedure, however, they ignore the rules 
designed to give stability to jury verdicts. 
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The court in Hodges found that the appealing party had failed to marshal the evidence and 
stated: "We emphasized it is counsel's professional duty to analyze the evidence with care 
and provide record citations for every asserted factual proposition." Id. Appellant's duty 
implicitly includes that appellant may not omit evidence which hurts her case. 
In plaintiff's brief, while she cites a few facts which do not support her case, 
she omits the majority of facts upon which the jury's finding on causation could have rested. 
Because plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence, plaintiff should be precluded from seeking 
review of this matter. Nonetheless, if one reviews the evidence, one finds that the medical 
doctors are in harmony, all stating that without sufficient force there could not be injury. 
While it is true that on direct examination some of the physicians stated that they believed 
the accident caused plaintiff's injuries, such conclusions were based upon plaintiffs 
statements to the physicians that an impact of 40 miles an hour had occurred. The evidence 
at trial showed that a 40 mile an hour collision did not occur. Accordingly, the jury had 
ample opportunity to find that with a minor touching of the vehicles as occurred in this case, 
there was no causative link between the accident and plaintiffs claimed injuries. 
C. ABUNDANT EVIDENCE EXISTED FOR THE JURY TO FIND THAT 
AN EXTREMELY LOW IMPACT WAS INVOLVED IN THIS 
ACCIDENT 
Pictures speak a thousand words, and accordingly, defendant directs the 
court's attention to the "damage" to plaintiffs vehicle as shown in defendant's Exhibit 13. 
See Addendum 1. 
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The testimony was as follows. Upon impact, defendant Mr. Brown stated that 
he felt nothing. (R.397). Likewise, Mrs. Brown, who was a passenger in Mr. Brown's 
vehicle, felt nothing. (R.722). Officer Hill, the only objective eyewitness to the accident, 
said his best estimate of the speed of defendant's vehicle upon impact was five miles per 
hour. (R.604; 610). Officer Hill stated that it is possible plaintiffs vehicle did not move at 
all. (R.610). Mr. Brown clarified his statement to Officer Baum, the investigating officer, 
that he was traveling at 40 miles an hour prior to the accident. (R.380). Mr. Brown did not 
tell Officer Baum how fast he was going at impact. (R.400). The plaintiff admitted at trial 
that there was no damage to her car. (R.475). Defendant reported that plaintiff told him 
that she was okay. (R.400). Plaintiff stated that she was thrown forward, a statement which 
defies the laws of physics and a point with which several expert witnesses disagreed. 
(R.574; 628; 713). 
Although plaintiff suggests Mr. DuVal may not have been qualified by 
repeatedly referring to him as a part-time reconstructionist, a review of evidence shows that 
Mr. DuVal is well qualified. In fact, part of his full-time profession as a member of the 
Provo Police Department includes the investigation of accidents. Mr. DuVal noted the 
following facts which he explained to the jury. There was only minor damage to the 
defendant's vehicle in this case. As stated, there was no damage to plaintiffs vehicle. Mr. 
DuVal explained how the structure of the vehicles would absorb all of the force, and that 
plaintiffs depressed brake would likewise absorb force. (R. 701). In other words, plaintiff 
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herself would experience no force. Mr. DuVal explained that plaintiffs description of her 
own body movement upon impact could not have happened as she stated. (R. 713). Mr. 
DuVal also explained how forces transferred and that since the solid structures behind the 
plastic grill in the front of defendant's vehicle had no damage, and that there was nothing 
between the plastic and those solid elements, there must not have been very much force. (R. 
696). Based upon these observations, and understanding the applicable Federal Bumper 
Standards, as well as the structural make-up of the vehicles involved, Mr. DuVal stated that 
in his best estimate the impact speed was three miles an hour. (R. 696). 
Upon the foregoing evidence, the jury may have found that the impact speed in 
this case was three miles an hour or less. The testimony of Mr. DuVal is comparatively 
more credible than Officer Baum. The jury is free to believe whom they wish, and they 
could have believed the testimony of Mr. DuVal and not that of Officer Baum. The jury 
could have found Mr. DuVal more qualified than Officer Baum. The jury may have been 
surprised that Officer Baum did not consider the testimony of the only objective eyewitness 
in making this conclusion as to speed (R. 523), and may have found his testimony 
unconvincing as he is unfamiliar with Federal Bumper Standards, and did not know what 
kind of forces would have been involved in an accident of this kind. (R. 521). While there 
may have been some minutia of evidence to the contrary, on appeal, the jury verdict will 
only be reversed upon a showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that a reasonable person would not differ in the outcome of the case. Pratt v. Pro 
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Data, 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994). As the jury had ample evidence before it to find 
that the accident at issue involved an impact speed of three miles an hour or less, the pivotal 
question then becomes, whether the accident could have caused the plaintiff injury given the 
low rate of speed. 
Plaintiffs main physical complaint related to Thoracic Outlet Syndrome. 
Plaintiff submitted medical bills in excess of $15,000, including the costs of thoracic outlet 
surgery. Plaintiffs suggested a damage award in closing arguments to the jury in excess of 
$340,000. (R. 777). Thoracic Outlet Syndrome and the causes therefore were explained to 
the jury by Dr. Mclff and Dr. Gaufin. Dr. Mclff, a medical doctor specializing in 
neuroradiology, informed the jury of his special interest and understanding of Thoracic 
Outlet Syndrome. (R. 741-42). He informed the jury that he modified the procedure for 
diagnosing Thoracic Outlet Syndrome and taught that procedure to Dr. Wing, the radiologist 
who performed the angiogram on plaintiff. (R. 742-43). 
Dr. Mclff explained to the jury some alternate causes of Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome, many of which are applicable to plaintiff. Dr. Mclff explained that it is typical 
for the onset of thoracic outlet symptoms to occur between the ages of 25 and 35. (R. 745). 
Plaintiff was 28 at the time of the accident and would therefore fall directly in this group. 
Likewise, plaintiff is female and Dr. Mclff explained that thoracic outlet problems are seen 
more often in females than males. (R. 746). Dr. Mclff also stated that plaintiff had a 
congenitally small thoracic outlet, (R. 746), Dr. Mclff testified that Thoracic Outlet 
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Syndrome, when trauma related, is usually caused by severe trauma such as a fractured 
clavicle or rib, and that the diagnostic films and plaintiffs history showed no evidence of a 
fractured clavicle or rib. (R. 749). Dr. Mclff testified that thoracic outlet problems are 
commonly confused with heart attack symptoms as they both can involved chest pain. (R. 
751). The jury was aware that plaintiff had suffered from chest pain before the accident and 
had been treated by a chiropractor. (R. 459). 
Dr. Mclff had reviewed plaintiffs medical records and noted that Dr. Gaufin's 
operative notes addressed adhesions or scar tissue found in the thoracic outlet region. Dr. 
Mclff opined that such could have been the result of repetitive use. (R. 751). Dr. Mclff 
stated that thoracic outlet problems are usually caused by normal life activities, such as 
housekeeping, mopping, and scrubbing, for example. Dr. Mclff stated that the only single-
event-trauma documented which would cause Thoracic Outlet Syndrome was a fracture of 
some kind. (R. 752-753). If a single traumatic event were to cause Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome, Dr. Mclff stated: "It would take a fairly significant single event." (R. 753). 
Dr. Gaufm likewise testified concerning the cause of the injuries claimed by 
plaintiff. On direct examination, Dr. Gaufin stated: 
I thought given the history she provided me, unless there was data to the 
contrary, that she stated she had been asymptomatic before her accident; that I 
believed that having been born with a congenitally narrow outlet, then an 
accident would cause extension and flexion movement of the neck resulting in 
some tearing of the muscles and soft tissues in that area, perhaps even some 
bleeding; that that creates a condition for scarring around the nerve and can 
cause what was once an asymptomatic condition to become symptomatic. 
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(R. 549-50)(emphasis added). Notably, Dr. Gaufm qualified his statement on causation with 
the premises of "given the history [plaintiff] provided" and "unless there was data to the 
contrary." IcL In this case, the jury was witness to a large amount of data to the contrary. 
Dr. Gaufin stated that plaintiff had given him a history of an impact at 40 miles per hour. 
(R. 570). As already highlighted, the jury could have found this history to be inaccurate. 
Like Dr. Mclff, Dr. Gaufin gave the jury examples of causes for Thoracic 
Outlet Syndrome other than trauma. Dr. Gaufin stated that Thoracic Outlet Syndrome has 
been associated with childbirth. (R. 572). The jury was informed that plaintiff had a three-
month old baby at the time of the accident. (R. 483). Dr. Gaufin also stated that carrying 
babies and small children can precipitate thoracic outlet problems. (R. 572). During 
plaintiff's examination she testified that she carried babies and small children. (R. 483). Dr. 
Gaufin stated that he had been given no history of prior neck pain, head pain, shoulder pain, 
upper back pain, or chest pain. (R. 576). The jury was informed that plaintiff had suffered 
from prior problems in these regards. When asked what kind of force would be needed to 
create problems with thoracic outlet area, Dr. Gaufin testified that there would have to be 
enough force to tear the muscle tissue. (R. 574). Dr. Gaufin also stated that chiropractic 
manipulations can cause thoracic outlet problems. (R. 575). Dr. Gaufin stated that he had 
not reviewed plaintiffs medical records. Accordingly, he might not have been made aware 
of the numerous preexisting conditions from which the plaintiff suffered or the other 
variables which may have affected his opinion on the cause of plaintiff s problems. Most 
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telling, Dr. Gaufin stated that he would not expect a collision of three or four miles an hour 
to cause thoracic outlet aggravation or injury. He stated that the possibility of thoracic outlet 
problems being caused by a three to four mile per hour impact was "very small, you might 
say remote." (R. 581-83). The jury could have found that the possibility was too remote. 
Dr. Root also testified as to plaintiffs condition. Dr. Root concurred with Dr. 
Gaufin and Dr. Mclff that one must have speed and force in order to inflict an injury on the 
human body. (R. 626). In other words, if there is no force there is no injury. Like all the 
other treating physicians and health care providers in this case, plaintiff had supplied Dr. 
Root with a history of a 40 mile per hour impact. (R. 630). Dr. Root stated that his 
treatment had to do with plaintiffs pain and would have been the same whether or not it was 
trauma-related. (R. 629). 
Plaintiffs main treating health care provider immediately after the accident 
was Dr. Cooper, a doctor of chiropractic. Plaintiff told Dr. Cooper that the impact speed of 
the accident was 40 miles per hour. (R. 638). Like all other medical witnesses in this case, 
Dr. Cooper admitted that one needs force to be applied to the body in order for an injury to 
occur. (R. 666; 670). Dr. Cooper acknowledged that he never diagnosed Thoracic Outlet 
Syndrome in the plaintiff. (R. 670). Dr. Cooper also stated that someone could push 
another person from behind, and that would not necessarily cause a flexion/extension injury. 
(R. 681-82). Interestingly, plaintiff never told Dr. Cooper about prior back pains. (R. 676). 
Dr. Cooper stated that there are many causes for muscle spasm, including stress. (R. 677). 
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The jury also heard from plaintiff herself giving testimony as to the force of 
the accident. The jury could easily have found this testimony not credible. Plaintiff stated 
on numerous occasions that she was thrown forward, which is a physical impossibility under 
the facts of this case, unless of course she had slammed on her brakes causing the accident. 
Plaintiff stated that she had been thrown two car lengths ahead, although the vehicle in front 
of her was only six feet ahead and was not touched. Plaintiffs testimony concerning the 
accident disagrees with all other witnesses to the accident, including the Browns and Officer 
Hill. 
The evidence at trial also showed that plaintiff had numerous preexisting 
conditions. Prior to the accident she experienced headaches (R. 674), back pain (R. 676), 
back pain associated with childbirth (R. 497) which was treated by a chiropractor, Temporal 
Mandibular Joint Disorder (TMJ), which included headaches and facial pain (R. 440), 
headache and ringing in the ears (R. 457), chest pain which at one time was thought to be 
some form of arthritis (R. 459), and to another doctor she described daily headaches which 
she had had for four to five years. (R. 461). 
Less than two years prior to the accident, plaintiff had complained of pain in 
her shoulders and upper back and lower back pain. (R. 462). Plaintiff had likewise 
complained of back pain flare-ups during pregnancy. (R. 462). Again, in 1987 plaintiff had 
complained to health care providers concerning headaches, neck pain, and upper back pain. 
(R.468). 
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In order to help the jury understand that plaintiff had not been injured in the 
accident at issue, a medical record from the day of the accident was read into evidence. An 
x-ray of the plaintiffs back was taken on the day of the accident and showed: 
The vertebral bodies, disc spaces and alignment are normal. The spinous 
process and pedicles are intact. The SI joints appear normal. No 
spondylolysis spondylolisthesis are noted. 
Impression: Normal AP and lateral views of the lumbar spine. Alignment 
and configuration of the cervical vertebrae are normal, and disc spaces are not 
narrowed. Pre-vertebral soft tissues are normal. Oblique view show patent 
neural foramina. Posterior elements are intact. 
(R.788). The radiologist's impression was: "Normal cervical spine exam." 
(R.788)(Defendant's Exhibit #28). 
The record is clear that plaintiff had her day in court and was given the 
opportunity to present whatever evidence she had that she had been injured in the accident at 
issue. The jury was well within its bounds to assess the credibility of the respective witnesses 
and to choose what evidence to believe or disbelieve. The fact that plaintiff said that she was 
completely asymptomatic prior to the accident is not compelling evidence given the fact that 
her medical records show preexisting conditions and also showed she was not diagnosed with 
Thoracic Outlet Syndrome until well after a year following the accident. In sum, the jury 
could have simply not believed plaintiff. 
As stated, all presumptions and inferences in this appeal regarding the 
sufficiency of the evidence must be made in favor of the validity of the verdict. Joseph v. 
W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960). A 
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conscientious review of the record, construing all things in favor of the verdict, leads to the 
conclusion that an overabundance of evidence existed to support a verdict that the accident in 
this case did not cause the injuries plaintiff claimed. There was ample evidence to believe 
that the collision occurred at three miles an hour or less. There was abundant evidence to 
believe that plaintiff suffered from preexisting injury and was not asymptomatic at the time 
of the accident. Likewise, there was abundant evidence upon which the jury could have 
rested their verdict that the force involved in this accident was not sufficient to cause injury 
to plaintiff. "It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence and make findings of fact." Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 
598, 601 (Utah 1983). Likewise, 
[w]here the evidence is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, we do 
not upset those findings of fact on appeal except upon a showing of the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, so clearly 
preponderating in appellant's favor that reasonable persons could not differ on 
the outcome of the case. 
IdL The Utah Supreme Court in Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 
1991) stated: 
We accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support the verdict rather 
than contrary inferences that support the appellant's version of the facts, even 
if we might have judged those inferences differently had we been deciding the 
matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate court. When the testimony 
of the witnesses is in conflict, we accept that testimony which supports the 
jury's verdict, unless it is inherently impossible, and ignore the evidence which 
does not support the verdict, even if we might think it more convincing. 
Applying the Hodges standard of review, the verdict must stand. 
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IL THERE WAS NO IMPROPER INJECTION OF THE ISSUE OF RELIGION 
INTO THIS TRIAL 
Out of over 800 pages of transcript, plaintiff wishes to assign reversible error 
upon two questions which were asked of defendant. First, Mr. Brown was asked what he 
did for a living, and second, Mr. Brown was asked the purpose of the trip at the time of the 
accident. Plaintiff claims that the jury's knowledge that defendant worked at BYU and 
taught Spanish there, as well as the fact that defendant and his wife were returning from a 
trip to a local Mormon temple, were facts that so prejudiced the jury that reversal is 
mandated and a new trial should be granted. 
Plaintiffs argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the issue of religion 
was not injected into trial. Second, defendant's answers were not belabored during 
examination nor were they even mentioned at any time by either attorney after the questions 
were answered. Lastly, plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the testimony. In order for this 
court to vacate the jury verdict, the court would have to conclude that a reasonable likelihood 
exists that absent the alleged error, the result would have been more favorable to the 
appealing party. State v. White. 880 P.2d 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The appellate court 
must conclude that had Mr. Brown not so testified the jury would have decided otherwise 
and that therefore the appellate court's confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. 
Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989); Pratt v. Pro Data Inc.. 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
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The issue of religion was not injected into the trial. Plaintiffs argument is 
actually a desperate attempt to inject an issue into the trial that simply did not exist. The 
record clearly indicates that neither counsel for the defendant nor defendant himself ever 
mentioned religion or made an appeal to religious prejudice. The first item of evidence 
which plaintiff claims is prejudical arose out of the following sequence of questions: 
Question: Incidentally, Mr. Brown, what do you do for a living? 
Answer: I work at BYU. 
Question: What do you do there, sir? 
Answer: I teach Spanish. 
Question: And how long have you been there? 
Answer: Nearly thirty years. 
(R.398). While the jury may have assumed that one who works at BYU is a member of the 
church which sponsors BYU, on its face, religion was not injected into the trial. Instead, 
defendant's counsel was simply attempting to lay some initial foundation as to who Mr. 
Brown is. Defense counsel never asked defendant about his religious beliefs, but simply 
asked what the defendant did for a living. This is common practice in trial. 
Personal background questions tend to put a witness at ease, allow a trier of 
fact a few moments to become familiar with the witness before hearing what 
she has to say, and add to the witness's credibility. Typical subjects of a 
background inquiry include witness's place of residence and employment, and 
general job duties. 
Bergman, Trial Advocacy in a Nutshell 111 (2nd Ed. West Pub. Co., 1989). In fact, when 
the court ruled on plaintiffs objection to the mention of the place of Mr. Brown's 
employment, the court ruled: "The court feels that that was merely background, 
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foundational." (R.731). Like defendant, plaintiff apprised the jury of her background 
information. Plaintiffs counsel asked for plaintiffs current address, how long she had been 
at that address, and where she lived before she was at that address. (R. 412). Also as 
background information, in order to personalize his client, plaintiffs counsel asked how long 
plaintiff knew her husband before she got married (R.413), and how long they had been 
married. (R.413). Thus, the record exhibits that both parties asked background and 
foundational questions to their clients in order to personalize them before the jury. 
Even if the jury knew that the defendant worked at BYU, it is a far stretch to 
conclude that the issue of religion was thrust into the trial thereby. The conclusion that the 
issue of religion was not thrust into trial is compounded by the fact that this testimony was 
not mentioned by any other witnesses, no reference thereto was ever made after the 
testimony, nor was there any allusion made thereto in closing argument. 
As a second basis to assert that religion was improperly injected into trial, 
plaintiff asserts that the following question and answer were prejudicial. Defendant's counsel 
asked the defendant, "Question: What was the purpose of your trip? Answer: We were 
returning from the temple." (R.399). This question was not posed for the purpose of 
soliciting any testimony of a religious nature. The answer could easily have been, "We were 
going home." However, defendant stated simply that they were returning home from the 
temple. The point was not belabored further, and there exists no evidence that the jury was 
prejudiced by the knowledge of this fact. 
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Interestingly, the exact same question was asked of plaintiff. Plaintiffs 
counsel asked plaintiff: "Question: On December 2, 1988, approximately 5:00 or 5:30 pm, 
where were you going? Answer: We were leaving Provo. Question: Why were you in 
Provo? Answer: We had been Christmas shopping." (R.413). While plaintiff asks this 
question as background or foundational testimony, defendant's question is also probative of 
whether or not the defendant was in a hurry. 
Plaintiff claims that allowing defendant to testify that he is employed as a 
Spanish professor at BYU and the fact that he had just attended a Mormon temple are 
prejudicial and should not be allowed into evidence as provided for under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The admission of evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion and is made in two steps. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). The reviewing court must first determine whether the trial court's 
finding the evidence was admissible is beyond the limits of reasonability. IcL If the 
admission of the evidence was beyond the limits of reasonability, then the reviewing court 
will reverse only if there was a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been 
reached had the evidence been excluded. KL; Utah DOT v. 6200 South Assoc. 872 P.2d 
462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, plaintiff cannot meet either of the steps required 
under the Dunn decision. Plaintiff has made no showing that the admission of evidence that 
the defendant was not in a hurry was beyond the limits of reasonability. Even more 
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important, it is inconceivable that this piece of evidence was so material as to convince the 
court that a different result would have been reached had the evidence been excluded. 
As the previous section of defendant's brief shows, there is abundant evidence 
upon which the jury could rest its verdict. In fact, the case was not exceptionally close. All 
the witnesses to the accident except the plaintiff, that is Mr. and Mrs. Brown and Officer 
Hill, concurred that the impact was five miles an hour or less. The physical damage to 
defendant's car and the absolute lack of damage to plaintiffs vehicle, coupled with the expert 
testimony of Greg DuVal easily would lead the reasonable person to believe that a low 
speed, insignificant impact had occurred. Once the premise is accepted that a low speed 
collision occurred, then all of the medical testimony concurs that without sufficient force, no 
injury could occur. Accordingly, the other defects claimed by plaintiff, specifically the 
questions relating to defendant's employment and where he was going at the time of the 
accident are hardly weighty matters which would indicate that the jury would have decided 
the matter otherwise had those facts not been in evidence. 
Defense counsel's question regarding the purpose of defendant's trip was 
probative of whether defendant was in a hurry or not. Whether defendant was in a hurry or 
not is an issue properly brought before the jury because it has bearing on defendant's state of 
mind prior to the accident, and would have some indication as to whether he was speeding or 
inattentive. A review of the record shows that such was the intent of the question. (R.399). 
Defense counsel did not ask the defendant where he had just been or if he was coming from 
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the temple in a subtle attempt to appeal to the jury's religious prejudice.3 Instead, the 
question was simply: "What was the purpose of your trip?" (R.399). The fundamental 
fairness of the trial was not affected and reversal is not called for because a different result is 
not likely to have occurred. Jones v. Carvel. 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). 
The case law cited by the plaintiff in support of her argument that the jury 
verdict should be vacated because the jury knew where Mr. Brown worked and was aware of 
the purpose of his trip at the time of the accident are unpersuasive when applied to the facts 
of this case. In fact, the cases plaintiff cites highlight that an egregious and prejudicial 
injection of an inflammatory issue did not occur in the case at bar. Almost all of the cases 
cited by plaintiff address either comments made in closing argument or cases where an 
elaboration of the evidence was made. For example, plaintiff cites the case of Giuamura v. 
O'Donnell. 466 N. Y.2d 692 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) for the proposition that elaborating on the 
religious preference of a plaintiff warranted a new trial. However, a thorough review of the 
Giuamura case indicates that while the court did state that elaborating on the religious 
preference of the plaintiff was improper, there were abundant other reasons why the case 
warranted a new trial. First, the Giuamura court stated that the evidence was insufficient to 
3Assuming that the majority of the members of the jury were members of the 
predominant religion in Utah County, any competent attorney would refrain from injecting 
the issue of religion since for every member of the jury panel that might be enamored with 
having a religion in common with a party, an equal number of jurors would be offended and 
find repugnant an appeal to decide the case on a religious basis. 
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support the verdict and on this basis a new trial should be granted. The court in Giuamura 
actually stated several different reasons why a new trial was warranted, including that the 
defense attorney indicated that plaintiffs husband was a criminal or was claiming welfare 
under six different names, referring to a chiropractor as a quack, referring to plaintiffs 
lawyer as a "very, very clever lawyer from a very prestigious New York City law firm in 
the Empire State Building," and eliciting testimony from a witness that "green poultice 
syndrome" is a disease which is cured by a nice big insurance check. IcL at 695. The court 
in Giuamura found that these cumulative and prejudicial comments warranted a new trial. 
In closing arguments, the defense attorney in Giuamura elaborated on the 
religion issue to an excess. The same cannot be said at the case at bar. In this case, defense 
counsel made no reference in closing argument to the defendant's place of employment, nor 
to the fact that he had been at a church service. The other cases cited by plaintiff similarly 
address unwarranted elaboration concerning religious preference or instances. For example 
in State v. Marvin. 606 P.2d 406 (Ariz. 1980), a criminal defendant attempted to put in to 
evidence his religious beliefs to show that he was not inclined to criminality. Mr. Brown's 
beliefs were not mentioned, and therefore Marvin is not comparable to this case. In short, 
the cases cited by the plaintiff are easily distinguishable.4 
4The case of Ogodziski v. Gara. 181 N.W. 227 (1921) involved questions related to 
religion. In this case, counsel for the defendant simply did not ask any question related to 
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The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed instances where an appellant has 
argued that an appeal to bias was made. In State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), a 
prosecutor made a single reference to a defendant's race during closing arguments. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor's reference to him as "a black man" was 
improper. The court held that the single reference was not improper for several reasons. 
First, it was obvious to the jury that the defendant was black. Second, the comment was not 
religion. Likewise, Bulled v. Chicago Transit Authority. 190 N.E. 2d 476 (111. Ct. App. 
1963), is inapposite where the court held that injection of religious questions was improper. 
The case of Kolaric v. Kaufman. 67 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), did not involve 
religious questions. Although the court stated that questions or argument of counsel relative 
to race, nationality, or religion of a party were improper, the court in Kolaric held the 
question of whether someone had been in prison and concentration camp improper because it 
suggested that the plaintiffs were members of a class subject to imprisonment. The court in 
Kolaric simply does not discuss religious questions. While perhaps not within the general 
knowledge of the plaintiff, persons were confined to concentration camps for numerous 
reasons besides Semitic origin. 
The court in Kolaric did not overturn the lower court just because a defense attorney 
asked a single question about the concentration camp. The court in Kolaric stated: "We 
have reached this conclusion from a consideration of the entire case and an application of the 
rules to the unique set of facts." Kolaric at 733. The case of Morgan v. Maunders. 37 
S.W. 2d 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931) like some of the other cases plaintiff cites, applied to 
closing arguments where the religious comments were held objectionable or counsel's 
comments arguably elaborated and highlighted the religion of a party. 
Ogodziski v. Gara. 181 N.W. 227 (Wis. 1921), likewise bears no resemblance to the 
facts of the case at bar. The incident in Ogodziski occurred in a church and defendant was a 
Catholic Priest. The plaintiff argued that the other defendants were taught blind obedience 
and not one of them would think of testifying differently than their priest had commanded 
and that all the powers of the Catholic church had been exerted to deceive the rights of the 
plaintiff and justice. The Ogodziski case exhibits the egregious level to which the injection 
of religion could rise. However, in this case, religion was not injected into the trial. The 
fact that the defendant had been to the temple was not a point on which defense counsel 
elaborated, and therefore, the cases cited by the plaintiff are inapplicable. 
41 
made with derogatory intent. Third, the prosecutor's remark was isolated and not part of a 
continued effort to bias the jury, as the appellant had contended. Id. at 448. The prejudicial 
effect complained of in Thomas is similar to that complained of in the case at bar, and 
accordingly the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Thomas applies. 
Defense counsel in the case at bar never mentioned religion. As it was 
obvious to the jury in Thomas that the defendant was black, it should hardly be a shock to a 
Utah County jury that defendant is a member of the predominant church in the county. 
Likewise, as the record reflects, there was no intent on the part of defense counsel or 
defendant in the case at bar to use religion for an improper purpose. Furthermore, any 
evidence from which an inference of religion could be construed was isolated, inadvertent 
and not an attempt, as appellant contends, to ". . . divert the jurors from a judicial 
consideration of the facts and the law." See Appellant's Brief at 33. 
Because the issue of religion was not in fact injected into the trial, plaintiffs 
basis for appeal is without merit. Even if evidence regarding religion had been elicited in 
this case, the testimony was isolated and not part of a continued effort to bias a jury. A 
vacation of the verdict is unwarranted. Accordingly, plaintiffs second point of alleged error 
does not provide a basis for reversal. 
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III. NO PREJUDICIAL ARGUMENT WAS MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff has failed to preserve this issue. Plaintiff claims that defendant 
inserted the name of plaintiffs counsel's law firm as an issue in the case on numerous 
occasions. For the most part, plaintiff failed to object below and therefore has waived the 
issue. Plaintiff claims that defense counsel's comment on plaintiffs counsel's willingness to 
use the jury system was prejudicial. See Plaintiffs Brief at 35. The court will note that no 
objection to this statement was made at trial. (R.376-77). 
Plaintiff also asserts that the court committed error by allowing defendant's 
counsel to state that Duncan's lawyer did not call all of the witnesses he said he would. See 
plaintiffs brief at 37. A review of the trial transcripts indicates that no objection was made 
to the argument below. (R.781). Accordingly, two of the statements to which plaintiff 
would assign error have been waived for the purposes of appeal as no objections were made 
below. 
During cross-examination of plaintiff, defense counsel impeached plaintiff 
using her answers to interrogatories. In order to impeach the witness, defense counsel 
attempted to establish whether plaintiff had answered the interrogatories which she signed 
under oath, or whether the answers were supplied by her attorneys. Plaintiff's answers to 
interrogatories were arguably inconsistent with her testimony at trial, and thus the answers 
constituted a viable means of impeachment. If the answers were untrue, why did she sign 
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the document? Defense counsel's examination constituted valid impeachment of plaintiff and 
no real objection was stated by plaintiffs counsel. Instead, plaintiffs counsel simply 
offered: "Any reference that counsel helped her [in answering interrogatories]-counsel does 
the same." (R. 454). Of course, defense counsel did not deny that attorneys often help their 
clients answer interrogatories and stated: "There's no problem there." Id,. Since defense 
counsel's questions were well within the bounds of impeachment in cross-examination, and 
because plaintiff did not state a viable objection, no error can be predicated upon this 
exchange. 
Plaintiff attempts to create a picture that defense counsel apprised the jury that 
the law firm of Robert J. DeBry & Associates was using the jury system and had assisted 
plaintiff in providing answers to written questions. See Plaintiffs Brief at 36. The jury was 
well aware that plaintiff was being represented by the law firm of Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates as such fact was presented to the jury during the voir dire process. (R. 313). 
Again, the fact that plaintiff was given assistance in providing answers to written 
interrogatories was proper impeachment. Plaintiff claims, however, that the foregoing 
statements were ground work laid in preparation of a closing argument wherein defense 
counsel stated: "Ladies and Gentlemen, counsel tells you it is too bad that Ms. Duncan has 
to be here. I agree with that. It is too bad. However, Mr. Brown did not bring her here. 
The law firm of Robert J. DeBry & Associates brought her here." (R. 778). It is clear that 
plaintiffs counsel was not objecting to the fact that defendant was asserting that the law firm 
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had brought their client to court, but instead was concerned that the jury was being reminded 
of who was representing the plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel stated: "This is the third time he 
has referred to our law firm." (R. 779). 
In any event, a review of the closing argument of plaintiff indicates that 
defendant's attorney was simply answering an allegation that had been made in plaintiffs 
closing argument. Counsel for plaintiff improperly argued: "Mr. Brown always denied he 
was responsible. (R. 766)."5 Subsequently, plaintiffs counsel stated: 
[The court] has found Mr. Brown negligent. He is entitled to his day in court. 
As an attorney, I understand that, if you want your day in court you are 
entitled to that. But when the evidence is so overwhelming, why put Lisa 
through the hoops; why lengthen the trial for that purpose? 
(R. 766-67). The comments made by defense counsel were not improper because they were 
responsive to the comments made by plaintiffs counsel. Such a conclusion is sustained by 
law. For example, in Smelko v. Brinton. 740 P.2d 591 (Kan. 1987), defense counsel stated 
during closing arguments that the plaintiff had consulted a lawyer shortly after the 
complained of injury occurred. In response, plaintiffs counsel said: "He went to a lawyer 
fairly soon afterwards, and I think you can see why." IcL at 595. The defendant in Smelko 
argued on appeal that plaintiffs counsel's statement was improper and prejudicial. The 
3See Henker v. Preybylowski. 524 A.2d 455, 458 (N.J. Ct. App. 1987)(Argument to the 
effect that the parties were forced to go to court because of the other party's unfair action is 
prejudicial). See also Plaintiffs brief at 39. 
45 
Smelko court held, however, that plaintiffs counsel's comments were "fairly responsive" to 
defendant's closing argument and thus did not constitute prejudicial reversible error. Id. 
Likewise, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Halliburton v. Public Service Co.. 
804 P.2d 213 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) addressed defendant's complaint on appeal concerning a 
reference made by plaintiffs counsel during closing argument about a settlement reached by 
the plaintiffs with the seller of a defective stove. In Halliburton the court concluded: "Since 
plaintiff's comments regarding settlement with the seller of the stove were made in response 
to defendant's closing argument concerning the responsibility of that seller," they were not 
prejudicial. IcL at 218. 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the mention of the effect of the settlement 
with the seller of the stove was improper, defendant opened the door on the 
subject by its argument, and it was permissible for plaintiffs counsel to 
respond. 
IcL See accord Uptain v. Huntington Lab. Inc.. 685 P.2d 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), affd. 
723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986); Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co.. 604 P.2d 823 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979). 
As in the case of Halliburton, the case at bar presents facts where plaintiffs 
counsel opened the door for defendant's arguments by asserting in his closing argument that 
defendant had wrongly denied responsibility for the accident and that he had put plaintiff 
"through the hoops" and lengthened the trial for an improper purpose. Where plaintiff has 
so opened the door, she should not be able to claim error when the defense responds. 
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Once again, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's counsel's comments 
were improper, they do not constitute reversible error. In order to overturn the jury's 
verdict on the basis of defense counsel's arguments, appellant must show that absent the 
improper argument, there was a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the 
appellant. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989). The appellant in this case has made 
no such showing. Furthermore, in order to constitute reversible error an improper remark in 
closing argument must be of an important fact and must be clearly unfair and outside the 
record. State v. Baroni. 79 Utah 285, 10 P.2d 622 (1932). After all, "[i]t is not every 
inaccuracy or flight of oratory that will constitute error." Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & 
Equip. Co.. 604 P.2d 823, 831 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). As stated, the jury already knew the 
name of plaintiffs law firm through the voir dire process and it would be a desperate stretch 
of the law for plaintiffs counsel to argue that the mere mentioning of his law firm's name 
would be grounds for overturning a jury verdict. The argument complained of was 
insignificant, was made in response to plaintiffs own argument, and was based on facts 
which were in the record. Accordingly, no error can be predicated thereupon and no basis 
for a vacation of the jury verdict exists. 
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CONCLUSION 
By failing to make a directed verdict motion, and by failing to marshal the 
evidence, plaintiff has waived her right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict in this matter. A review of the record indicates in any event, that significant and 
abundant evidence exists which supports the verdict. The issue of religion was not injected 
into this trial, and plaintiffs alleged improper closing arguments were responsive to 
comments made by plaintiffs counsel. Defendant, therefore, requests this court to affirm the 
jury's verdict. Plaintiff has argued no reasonable grounds for reversal and the record is clear 
that plaintiff had her day in court and must now live with the jury's verdict. 
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